Daniel J. Lenihan, MD

Controllers are to be examined every four years until the age of 40 virus 4 year old buy tetracycline 500 mg line, then every two years (and after age 50 preferably once per year) infection prevention week order discount tetracycline line, and it is important to exclude virus 0f2490 tetracycline 500mg sale, so far as possible antibiotic resistance questionnaire discount tetracycline 250mg online, any cause for incapacitation during this time antibiotics help acne buy genuine tetracycline online. Research conducted in one Contracting State has shown a higher incidence of stress-related illness such as hypertension and peptic ulceration as compared with a control population antibiotic young living generic 500 mg tetracycline mastercard. Stress-related factors in air traffic controllers Stressful factors Non-stressful factors Being overloaded Responsibility for safety and lives Boredom High work load Failure to conform by others Shift working 16. A good occupational health programme is clearly of value and, as an example, close attention should be paid to short-term sickness absence for apparently trivial conditions as a good indicator for stress. Experience has shown, however, that some controllers still report a build-up of stress because apparently none of these channels is available to them. If correction is needed to perform one or more of these tasks, one pair of glasses should meet the requirements, so that it is unnecessary to remove or change the glasses when operating. Special correcting spectacles, suitable only for the work place, may be necessary. Varifocal lenses are a good solution for many although they may cause some peripheral distortion and often require several days of familiarization before they can be used on duty. Single-vision near correction (full lenses of one power only, appropriate for reading) may be acceptable for certain air traffic control duties (whereas they are not for pilots). However, fatigue is an important risk to flight safety and one which appears to be of increasing importance. They may also be asked to provide guidance to aircraft operators concerning the avoidance of fatigue. It addresses individual mitigation strategies and does not attempt to cover those aspects of fatigue risk mitigation that are addressed by management, such as limitations of duty periods and provision of adequate rest opportunities. Further information can be obtained from standard textbooks, such as that referenced at the end of this chapter. Amendment 33 to Annex 6 (applicable in 2009) introduced substantial changes to the flight time, flight duty periods, duty periods and rest scheme applied to flight and cabin crew (cabin crew, while not licensed under Annex 1 requirements, are also subject to these provisions). Transient fatigue may be described as fatigue that is dispelled by a single sufficient period of rest or sleep. Cumulative fatigue occurs after incomplete recovery from transient fatigue over a period of time. These regulations shall be based upon scientific principles and knowledge, with the aim of ensuring that flight and cabin crew members are performing at an adequate level of alertness. In addition, some definitions from Annex 6 of terms related to fatigue are important and these, along with comments related to their use in practice, are provided in Appendix 1 to this chapter. With one or two pilots available to augment the basic crew, rest opportunities during flight are built into the crew schedule so that, on a rotational basis, each flight crew member can rest. The in-flight rest area can vary from seats within the passenger compartment to an independent bunk facility. These are: sleep hygiene, use of hypnotics and melotonin, and recognition and treatment of sleep disorders, especially obstructive sleep apnoea. To an extent, good sleep hygiene follows a common sense approach such as: within a few hours of a sleep opportunity avoid caffeine, heavy exercise, alcohol intake exceeding a small amount, and large meals. However, it adversely affects the quality of sleep later on during the sleep period. Alcohol is therefore not useful as a hypnotic, and if more than one unit is taken it is likely to increase the chance of fatigue. Another strategy is to adopt a sleep pattern during the layover that encourages sleep immediately prior to departure from the rest facility to the. In these circumstances care must be taken to ensure that that the pre-departure rest opportunity will provide conditions conducive to sleep. If this is the case, they should establish, as soon as possible, a routine in keeping with the local day/night cycle. Exposure to sunlight helps entrain circadian rhythms to a new time zone through the suppression of melatonin production (primarily by the pineal gland), so during waking hours exposure to bright light, ideally to sunlight, can be beneficial. If they cannot avoid taking some sleep, they should limit this to two or three hours in order to promote sleep when the normal (local night) bedtime arrives. Those who find themselves awake in the early hours of the morning can get out of bed and undertake some mental activity such as reading for an hour or so, or until feeling sleepy if sooner, before attempting to sleep once more. As described, there is a variety of coping mechanisms (and a variety of individual responses to them), and crew members should be encouraged to familiarize themselves with available options and choose the ones that are effective for them personally. Such mental factors can adversely affect sleep when at home and their effect may be exaggerated when away from home, and sleeping is already a challenge. The importance of addressing mental health issues in the periodic 2 medical examination is considered elsewhere in this manual. However, it can be a better strategy to have a pilot report for duty having obtained a good sleep subsequent to taking an approved hypnotic, rather than report when tired, having slept poorly, or having taken an unapproved hypnotic that might be inappropriate for use by crew members. All relevant methods of improving sleep hygiene should have been considered before use of a hypnotic is recommended. A survey of regional pilots in 2010 reported that about 14 per cent used hypnotics to help them sleep. Another report, in 2004, indicated that 19 per cent of pilots employed by a major airline used prescribed hypnotics on an occasional basis. Crew members should be cautioned against obtaining hypnotics in this manner and in using them without medical supervision, as their quality and dose are usually uncertain. In addition, hypnotics have many potential side effects that can adversely affect flight safety, and medical supervision is needed to avoid or manage these. Such advice may be to seek more specialist information concerning the use of hypnotics in the aviation environment. Prior consent for discussion of personal medical issues with the company, regulatory authority or personal physician will be needed from the flight or cabin crew member. The former is usually used when crew members report difficulty in going to sleep and the latter when sleep is truncated with frequent awakenings. Hypnotics with a short half-life may be the choice for inducing sleep and for situations where the sleep period is expected to be short. On the other hand sleep sustainability can be accomplished with longer acting hypnotics with a longer half-life, and temazepam is an example of a hypnotic that has been shown to sustain sleep reasonably well. Other medications may be useful in particular circumstances, and zolpidem is recommended as suitable by the Aerospace Medical Association, with a minimum time between ingestion and reporting for duty of 12 hours. However, note that not all potentially suitable hypnotics are available in each Contracting State, and their formulation. This is particularly important when determining an appropriate recommendation for the time between ingestion and exercising licence privileges. A good safety margin should be included, bearing in mind the effect of biological variation. In all cases, the use of hypnotics beyond a few days, or on a frequent basis, should be strongly discouraged as tolerance and dependence may otherwise occur. Additional reviews should be undertaken in the early stages when a hypnotic is used for the first time. When the time from ingestion to reporting for duty may be just a few hours, it is essential that both the doctor advising the use of a hypnotic and the crew member taking it are fully aware of the intended effects, possible side effects and duration of action. As with any medication, but particularly so for hypnotics, it is vital that a crew member test the effects during a ground-based trial prior to use during a roster of duty, to experience the effects and to ascertain that no significant adverse side effects are observed. Its usefulness as a hypnotic agent is debatable, and its effectiveness to treat insomnia is not clinically proven. Some research has shown it to be of use when taken for the purpose of synchronizing circadian rhythms to a new time zone. However, there are several cautions that need to be considered before a crew member can be advised to take melatonin. For the same reason as in (1) above, the amount of melatonin in each tablet is not accurately known and may differ from that indicated on the package. The amount of melatonin required for circadian synchronization remains a subject of research. The timing of when the melatonin is taken is important and on occasion could increase the time taken to synchronize circadian rhythms to local time. The obstruction may be complete, leading to cessation of airflow (an apnoea) or partial, leading to a markedly reduced inspiratory flow (a hypopnoea). During apnoeas and hypopnoeas the difficulty in inspiration causes arousals from sleep. Because of this association, many sleep clinics conduct a cardiovascular risk profile for patients. Most patients seen in a sleep clinic are significantly overweight, though not all. However, they may have a history of severe snoring which has subsequently lessened. First published in 1991 and named after the Sleep Disorders Unit, Epworth Hospital, Melbourne, Australia. Any pilot who has fallen asleep on the flight deck, outside a planned rest period, should be investigated. Because of the associated cardiovascular risk, the usual risk factors should be assessed and treated. Periodic leg movement disorder, narcolepsy, idiopathic hypersomnolence, sleep phase reversal, poor sleep hygiene and sleep disturbance due to depression or pain should be considered in patients who have hypersomnolence but normal respiratory sleep studies. A flight crew that comprises more than the minimum number required to operate the aeroplane and in which each flight crew member can leave his assigned post and be replaced by another appropriately qualified flight crew member for the purpose of in-flight rest. A crew member who performs, in the interest of safety of passengers, duties assigned by the operator or the pilot-in-command of the aircraft, but who shall not act as a flight crew member. Any task that flight or cabin crew members are required by the operator to perform, including, for example, flight duty, administrative work, training, positioning and standby when it is likely to induce fatigue. Comment: All time spent on duty can induce fatigue in crew members and should therefore be taken into account when arranging rest periods for recovery. A period which starts when a flight or cabin crew member is required by an operator to report for or to commence a duty and ends when that person is free from all duties. A data-driven means of continuously monitoring and managing fatigue-related safety risks, based upon scientific principles and knowledge as well as operational experience, that aims to ensure relevant personnel are performing at adequate levels of alertness. A licensed crew member charged with duties essential to the operation of an aircraft during a flight duty period. A period which commences when a flight or cabin crew member is required to report for duty that includes a flight or a series of flights and which finishes when the aeroplane finally comes to rest and the engines are shut down at the end of the last flight on which he/she is a crew member. Comment: the definition of flight duty period is intended to cover a continuous period of duty that always includes a flight or series of flights for a flight or cabin crew member. It includes all duties such a crew member may be required to carry out from the moment he reports for duty until he completes the flight or series of flights and the aeroplane finally comes to rest and the engines are shut down. A flight duty period does not include the period of travelling time from home to the point of reporting for duty. It is the responsibility of the crew member to report for duty in an adequately rested condition. Time spent positioning at the behest of the operator is part of a flight duty period when this time immediately precedes. The total time from the moment an aeroplane first moves for the purpose of taking off until the moment it finally comes to rest at the end of the flight. The location nominated by the operator to the crew member from where the crew member normally starts and ends a duty period or a series of duty periods. A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation. The transferring of a non-operating crew member from place to place as a passenger at the behest of the operator. The time at which flight and cabin crew members are required by an operator to report for duty. A continuous and defined period of time, subsequent to and/or prior to duty, during which flight or cabin crew members are free of all duties. Comment: the definition of rest period requires that crew members be relieved of all duties for the purpose of recovering from fatigue.

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Sensitivity can be increased if multiple specimens/multiple body sites are tested infection 5 weeks after abortion generic 250 mg tetracycline amex. An antibody rise between acute and convalescent phase sera tested in parallel is highly specic virus going around purchase generic tetracycline on line. The surveillance case denitions are based on available clinical and epidemiological data and are supplemented by laboratory tests antimicrobial-induced mania buy tetracycline overnight. Case denitions continue to be reviewed as diagnostic tests currently used in research settings become more widely available virus hoaxes buy discount tetracycline. A case should be excluded from surveillance if an alternative diagnosis can fully explain the illness as more diagnostic tests continue to be performed and the disease evolves virus names buy 250 mg tetracycline mastercard. A case initially classied as suspect or probable for whom an alternative diagnosis can fully explain the illness should be excluded after considering the possibility of co-infection bacteria ua rare buy generic tetracycline 250mg line. From a review of probable cases, dyspnoea sometimes rapidly progresses to respiratory failure requiring ventilation; about 89% of cases recover and the case fatality rate is about 11%. Current understanding, based on limited numbers of patients, suggests that the case fatality is less than 1% in persons aged 24 years or younger, 6% in persons aged 25 to 44 years, 15% in persons aged 45 to 64 years, and above 50% in persons aged 65 years or more. The virus is known to have been transported by infected humans to over 20 additional sites in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, Europe, the Middle East and the Pacic. A similar isolated laboratory worker infection occurred 3 months later in Taipei (Taiwan, China), without secondary transmission. A third laboratory infection involving 2 workers occurred in Beijing in April 2004. One of the cases transmitted the infection to a family member and a health worker, which resulted in a small third generation outbreak and full containment activities by the Chinese health authorities. Initial studies in Guandong Province, China, showed similar coronaviruses in some animal species sold in markets and further study continues. Initial studies suggest that transmission does not occur before onset of clinical signs and symptoms, and that maximum period of communicability is less than 21 days. Health workers are at great risk, especially if involved in pulmonary procedures such as intubation or nebulization, and serve as a major entry point of the disease into the community. Because of the small numbers of cases reported among children, it has not been possible to assess the inuence of age. Soiled gloves, stethoscopes and other equipment must be treated with care as they have potential to spread infection. Disinfectants such as fresh bleach solutions must be widely available at appropriate concentrations. If an independent air supply is not feasible, air conditioning should be turned off and windows opened (if away from public places) for good ventilation. Surfaces should be cleaned with broad spectrum disinfectants of proven antiviral activity Movement of patients outside the isolation unit should be avoided. Visits should be kept to a minimum and personal preventive equipment used under supervision. Handwashing is crucial and access to clean water essential with handwashing before and after contact with any patient, after activities likely to cause contamination, and after removing gloves. Alcohol-based skin disinfectants can be used if there is no obvious organic material contamination. Particular attention should be paid to interventions such as use of nebulizers, chest physiotherapy, bronchoscopy or gastroscopy and other interventions that may disrupt the respiratory tract or place the healthcare worker in close proximity to the patient and to potentially infected secretions. From current epidemiological evidence, a contact is a person who cared for, lived with, or had direct contact with the respiratory secretions, body uids and/or excretion. Use full personal protection equipment for collection of specimens and for treatment/interventions that may cause aerosolization, such as the use of nebulisers with a bronchodilator, chest physiotherapy, bronchoscopy, gastroscopy, any procedure/intervention that may disrupt the respiratory tract. Ribavirin with or without use of steroids has been used in several patients, but its effectiveness has not been proven and there has been a high incidence of severe adverse reactions. It has been proposed that a coordinated multi-centered approach to establishing the effectiveness of ribavirin therapy and other proposed interventions be examined. Place under active surveillance for 10 days and recommend voluntary isolation at home and record temperature daily, stressing to the contact that the most consistent rst symptom that is likely to appear is fever. Ensure contact is visited or telephoned daily by a member of the public health care team to determine whether fever or other signs and symptoms are developing. Ensure adequate triage facilities and clearly indicate to the general public where they are located and how they can be accessed. Disaster Implications: As with other emerging infections, severe adverse economic impact and socio-economic consequences have been shown to occur. A global response facilitating the work and exchange of information among scientists, clinicians and public health experts has been shown to be effective in providing information and effective evidence-based policies and strategies. In typical cases, the stools contain blood and mucus (dysentery) resulting from mucosal ulcerations and conuent colonic crypt microabscesses caused by the invasive organisms; many cases present with a watery diarrhea. Severity and case-fatality rate vary with the host (age and pre-existing nutritional state) and the serotype. Shigella dysenteriae 1 (Shiga bacillus) spreads in epidemics and is often associated with serious disease and complications including toxic megacolon, intestinal perforation and the hemolyticuraemic syndrome; case-fatality rates have been as high as 20% among hospitalized cases even in recent years. Isolation of Shigella from feces or rectal swabs provides the bacteriological diagnosis. Outside the human body Shigella remains viable only for a short period, which is why stool specimens must be processed rapidly after collection. Infection is usually associated with large numbers of fecal leukocytes detected through microscopical examination of stool mucus stained with methylene blue or Gram. Groups A, B and C are further divided into 12, 14, and 18 serotypes and subtypes, respectively, designated by arabic numbers and lower case letters. A specic virulence plasmid is necessary for the epithelial cell invasiveness manifested by Shigellae. Shigellosis is endemic in both tropical and temperate climates; reported cases represent only a small proportion of cases, even in developed areas. The geographical distribution of the 4 Shigella serogroups is different, as is their pathogenicity. More than one serotype is commonly present in a community; mixed infections with other intestinal pathogens also occur. Infection may occur after the ingestion of contaminated food or water as well as from person to person. Individuals primarily responsible for transmission include those who fail to clean hands and under ngernails thoroughly after defecation. They may spread infection to others directly by physical contact or indirectly by contaminating food. Water and milk transmission may occur as the result of direct fecal contamination; ies can transfer organisms from latrines to uncovered food items. Asymptomatic carriers may transmit infection; rarely, the carrier state may persist for months or longer. Appropriate antimicrobial treatment usually reduces duration of carriage to a few days. The elderly, the debilitated and the malnourished of all ages are particularly susceptible to severe disease and death. General measures to improve hygiene are important but often difcult to implement because of their cost. An organized effort to promote careful handwashing with soap and water is the single most important control measure to decrease transmission rates in most settings. Common-source foodborne or waterborne outbreaks require prompt investigation and intervention whatever the infecting species. Institutional outbreaks may require special measures, including separate housing for cases and new admissions, a vigorous program of supervised handwashing, and repeated cultures of patients and attendants. The most difcult outbreaks to control are those that involve groups of young children (not yet toilet-trained) or the mentally decient, and those where there is an inadequate supply of water. Closure of affected day care centers may lead to placement of infected children in other centers with subsequent transmission in the latter, and is not by itself an effective control measure. Preventive measures: Same as those listed under typhoid fever, 9A1-9A10, except that no commercial vaccine is available. Recognition and report of outbreaks in child care centers and institutions are especially important. Because of the small infective dose, patients with known Shigella infections should not be employed to handle food or to provide child or patient care until 2 successive fecal samples or rectal swabs (collected 24 or more hours apart, but not sooner than 48 hours after discontinuance of antimicrobials) are found to be Shigella-free. Patients must be told of the importance and effectiveness of handwashing with soap and water after defecation as a means of curtailing transmission of Shigella. In communities with an adequate sewage disposal system, feces can be discharged directly into sewers without preliminary disinfection. Thorough handwashing after defecation and before handling food or caring for children or patients is essential if such contacts are unavoidable. Cultures of contacts should generally be conned to food handlers, attendants and children in hospitals, and other situations where the spread of infection is particularly likely. Antibiotics, selected according to the prevailing antimicrobial sensitivity pattern of where cases occur, shorten the duration and severity of illness and the duration of pathogen excretion. They should be used in individual cases if warranted by the severity of illness or to protect contacts. During the past 50 years Shigella have shown a propensity to acquire resistance against newly introduced antimicrobials that were initially highly effective. Multidrug resistance to most of the low-cost antibiotics (ampicillin, trimethoprim-sufamethoxazole) is common and the choice of specic agents will depend on the antibiogram of the isolated strain or on local antimicrobial susceptibility patterns. In many areas, the high prevalence of Shigella resistance to trimethoprim-sufamethoxazole, ampicillin and tetracycline has resulted in a reliance on uoroquinolones such as ciprooxacin as rst line treatment, but resistance to these has also occurred. The use of antimotility agents such as loperamide is contraindicated in children and generally discouraged in adults since these drugs may prolong illness. If administered in an attempt to alleviate the severe cramps that often accompany shigellosis, antimotility agents should be limited to 1 or at most 2 doses and never be given without concomitant antimicrobial therapy. Disaster implications: A potential problem where personal hygiene and environmental sanitation are decient (see Typhoid fever). Except for a laboratory-associated smallpox death at the University of Birmingham, England, in 1978, no further cases have been identied. Because of increasing concerns about the potential for deliberate use of clandestine supplies of variola virus, it is important that health care workers become familiar with the clinical and epidemiological features of smallpox and how it can be distinguished from chickenpox. Fatalities normally occurred between the fth and seventh day, occasionally as late as the second week. Fewer than 3% of variola major cases experienced a fulminant course, characterized by a severe prodrome, prostration, and bleeding into the skin and mucous membranes; such hemorrhagic cases were rapidly fatal. The rash of smallpox could also be signicantly modied in previously vaccinated persons, to the extent that only a few highly atypical lesions might be seen. In such cases, prodromal illness was not modied but the maturation of lesions was accelerated with crusting by the tenth day. Smallpox was most frequently confused with chickenpox, in which skin lesions commonly occur in successive crops with several stages of maturity at the same time. The chickenpox rash is more abundant on covered than on exposed parts of the body; the rash is centripetal rather than centrifugal.

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Occurrence provides information on where the disease is known to occur and in which population groups it is most likely to occur bacteria killing products buy discount tetracycline on line. Mode of transmission describes the mechanisms by which the infectious agent is spread to humans antibiotic resistance effects on society buy cheap tetracycline on line. Incubation period is the time interval between initial contact with the infectious organism and the rst appearance of symptoms associated with the infection antibiotic list for uti order tetracycline with visa. Period of communicability is the time during which an infectious agent may be transferred directly or indirectly from an infected person to another person; from an infected animal to xxiii humans; or from an infected person to animals treatment for uti gram negative bacilli cheap tetracycline 250 mg on line, including arthropods antibiotic resistance korea order tetracycline online. Susceptibility (including immunity) provides information on human or animal populations at risk of infection virus noro buy line tetracycline, or that are resistant to either infection or disease. Control of patient, contacts and the immediate environment: measures designed to prevent further spread of the disease from infected persons, and specic best current treatment to minimize the period of communicability and to reduce morbidity and mortality. Epidemic measures: describes those procedures of an emergency character designed to limit the spread of a communicable disease that has developed widely in a group or community, or within an area, state or nation. Disaster implications: given a disaster, indicates the likelihood that the disease might constitute a major problem if preventive actions are not initiated. International measures: outlines those interventions designed xxiv to protect populations against the known risk of infection from international sources. Outbreaks can be electronically reported 24 hours a day by e-mail at outbreak@who. Measures in case of deliberate use of biological agents to cause harm (formerly bioterrorism measures): for selected diseases, this new section provides information and guidelines for public health workers who may be confronted with a threatened or actual act of deliberate use with a specic infectious disease agent. The name of each primary reviewer is provided in square brackets at the end of each disease entry. Some diseases did not undergo major updating for the 18th edition and show no primary reviewer. Case reports: Case reporting provides diagnosis, age, sex and date of onset for each person with the disease. Sometimes it includes identifying information such as the name and address of the person with the disease. Additional information such as treatment provided and its duration are required for certain case reports. National guidelines and legislation indicate which diseases must be reported, who is responsible for reporting, the format for reporting, and how case reports are to be entered into and forwarded within the national system. Outbreak reports: Outbreak reporting provides information about an increase above the expected number of persons with a communicable disease that may be of public concern. The specic disease may not be included in the list of diseases ofcially reportable, or it may be of unknown etiology if it is newly recognized or emerging. National guidelines and legislation indicate which type of oubtreak must be reported, who is responsible for reporting, the format for reporting, and how case reports are to be entered into and forwarded within the national system. In general, outbreak reporting is required by the most rapid means of communication available. The key proposals in the revision are to: Require the establishment of dened core capacities in surveillance and response to public health emergencies. Collective outbreak reports including the number of cases and deaths may be requested on a daily or weekly basis for diseases with outbreak potential such as inuenza. Class 2: Case report regularly required wherever the disease occurs Diseases of relative urgency require reporting either because identication of contacts is required or because the source of infection must be known in order to begin control measures. National health authorities may also require reports of infectious diseases caused by agents that may be used deliberately. Class 3: Selectively reportable in recognized endemic areas Many national health authorities do not require case reporting of diseases of this class. Reporting may however be required by reason of xxvii undue frequency or severity, in order to stimulate control measures or acquire essential epidemiological data. Examples of diseases in this class are scrub typhus, schistosomiasis and fasciolopsiasis. Information required includes number of cases, date of onset, population at risk and apparent mode of spread. Examples are staphylococcal foodborne intoxication and outbreaks of an unidentied etiology. Class 5: Ofcial report not ordinarily justiable Diseases in this class occur sporadically or are uncommon, often not directly transmissible from person to person (chromoblastomycosis), or of an epidemiological nature that offers no practical measures for control (common cold). Steps in an outbreak response are systematic and based on epidemiological evidence despite the fact that public and political reaction, urgency and the local situation may make this difcult. The following steps provide minimal guidance for responding to outbreaks and are sometimes done concurrently: Verify the diagnosis Conrm the existence of an outbreak Identify affected persons and their characteristics Record case histories Identify additional cases Dene and investigate population at risk Formulate a hypothesis as to source and spread of the outbreak Contain the outbreak Manage cases Implement control measures to prevent spread Conduct ongoing disease surveillance Prepare a report. A tentative differential diagnosis may be made, for example food poisoning or cholera, that enables the investigator to anticipate the diagnostic specimens required and the kind of equipment to be used during the investigation. If initial cases have died, the extent and need for autopsies should be considered. For surveillance and control purposes, investigators must agree on a common surveillance case denition (this may not always correspond to the clinical case denition). Conrm the existence of an outbreak Some diseases, although long endemic in an area, remain unrecognized; new cases may come to light, for instance, when new treatments attract patients who previously relied on traditional medicines. An outbreak can be demonstrated on a graph of incidence over time and by a map of geographical extension. For endemic diseases, an outbreak is said to have begun when incidence rises above the normally expected level. For diseases showing a cyclical or seasonal variation, the average incidence rates over particular weeks or months of previous years, or average high or low levels over a period of years, may be used as baselines. Identify affected persons and their characteristics Record case histories Information about each conrmed or suspected case must be recorded to obtain a complete understanding of the outbreak. Usually this information includes name, age, sex, occupation, place of residence, recent movements, details of symptoms (including dates and time of onset) and dates of previous immunization against childhood or other diseases. If the incubation period is known, information on possible source contacts may be sought. This information is best recorded on specially prepared record forms called line lists. The logistics of form duplication, data entry and verication must be worked out in relation to reporting (See Reporting). Identify additional cases Initial notication of an outbreak may come from a clinic or hospital; enquiries in health centres, dispensaries and villages in the area may reveal other cases, sometimes with a range of additional symptoms. Overall or specic attack rates (age-specic village-specic) can then be calculated. These calculations may lead to new hypotheses requiring further investigation and development of study designs. Microbiological typing and susceptibility to antibiotics can then be used to develop appropriate control measures. Formulate a hypothesis as to source and spread of the outbreak Determine why the outbreak occurred when it did and what set the stage for its occurrence. Whenever possible the relevant conditions before the outbreak should be determined. For foodborne outbreaks it is necessary to determine source, vehicle, predisposing circumstances and portal of entry. All links in the process must be considered: i) disease-causing agent in the population and its characteristics; ii) existence of a reservoir; iii) mode of exit from this reservoir or source; iv) mode of transmission to the next host; v) mode of entry; vi) susceptibility of the host. Contain the outbreak the key to effective containment of an outbreak is a coordinated investigation and response involving health workers including clinicians, epidemiologists, microbiologists, health educators and the public health authority. The best way to ensure coordination may be to establish an outbreak containment committee early in the outbreak. Manage cases Health workers, including clinicians, must assume responsibility for treatment of diagnosed cases. In outbreaks of meningitis, plague or cholera, emergency accommodation may have to be found and additional staff may require rapid essential training. Outbreaks of diseases such as sleeping sickness and cholera may require special treatment and recourse to drugs not normally available. Outbreaks such as poliomyelithis may leave in their wake patients with an immediate need for physiotherapy and rehabilitation; timely organization of these services will lessen the impact of the outbreak. Implement control measures to prevent spread After the epidemiological characteristics of the outbreak have been better understood, it is possible to implement control measures to prevent further spread of the infectious agent. However, from the very beginning xxx of the investigation the investigative team must attempt to limit the spread and the occurrence of new cases. Immediate isolation of affected persons can prevent spread, and measures to prevent movement in or out of the affected area may be considered. Whatever the urgency of the control measures they must also be explained to the community at risk. Population willingness to report new cases, attend vaccination campaigns, improve standards of hygiene or other such activities is critical for successful containment. If supplies of vaccine or drugs are limited, it may be necessary to identify the groups at highest risk initial for control measures. Once these urgent measures have been put in place, it is necessary to initiate more permanent ones such as health education, improved water supply, vector control or improved food hygiene. It may be necessary to develop and implement long-term plans for continued vaccination after an initial campaign. Conduct ongoing disease surveillance During the acute phase of an outbreak it may be necessary to keep persons at risk. After the outbreak has initially been controlled, continued community surveillance may be needed in order to identify additional cases and to complete containment. Sources of information for surveillance include: i) notications of illness by health workers, community chiefs, employers, school teachers, heads of families; ii) certication of deaths by medical authorities; iii) data from other sources such as public health laboratories, entomological and veterinary services. It may be necessary to maintain estimates of the immune status of the population when immunization is part of control activities, by relating the amount of vaccine used to the estimated number of persons at risk, including newborns. Prepare a report A report should be prepared at intervals during containment if possible, and after the outbreak has been fully contained. Reports may be: i) a popular account for the general public so that they understand the nature of the outbreak and what is required of them to prevent spread or recurrence; ii) an account for planners in the Ministry of Health/local authority so as to ensure that the necessary administrative steps are taken to prevent recurrence: iii) a scientic report for publication in a medical journal or epidermiological bulletin (reports of recent outbreaks are valuable aids when teaching staff about outbreak control). For example, it may be necessary to show that sliced foodstuffs can be contaminated by an infected slicing machine if this has not been proven during the outbreak investigation. Such verication requires more laboratory facilities than are available in the eld, and is often not completed until long after the outbreak has been contained. The response will of necessity involve the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies as well as public health services, and possibly the Defence Ministry as well, especially if the event is considered of non-domestic origin. Difculties in communication and approaches may arise, since these disciplines do not usually work together. The public health response included identifying all those at risk of infection through the postal system, and prescribing antibiotics to over 32 000 persons identied as potentially in contact with envelopes contaminated with anthrax spores. The event and associated hoaxes caused unprecedented demands on public health laboratory services, and several nations had to recruit private laboratories to deal with the overow. If the agent is widely dispersed and/or easily transmissible, a surge capacity may be required to accommodate large numbers of patients, and systems must be available for the rapid mobilization and distribution of medicines or vaccines according to the agent released. In the event that the agent is transmissible, additional capacity will be required for contact tracing and active surveillance. Some of the infectious agents of concern include bacteria and rickettsia (anthrax, brucellosis, melioidosis, plague, Q fever, tularemia, and typhus), fungi (coccidioidomycosis) and viruses (arboviruses, loviruses and variola virus). International threat analysis xxxii considers that deliberate use of biological agents to cause harm is a real threat and that it can occur at any time; however, such risk analysis is not generally considered a public health function. According to national intelligence and defence services, there is evidence that national and international networks have engineered biological agents for use as weapons, in some instances with suggestions of attempts to increase pathogenicity and to develop delivery mechanisms for their deliberate use. Infection of humans may be a one-time occurrence, or may be repeated over a period of time after the initial occurrence. The agent used will determine whether there is a risk of person-to-person transmission after the initial and subsequent attacks; information on this risk is covered in more detail under specic disease agents. Incubation period, period of communicability and susceptibility are agent-specic. Prevention of the deliberate use of biological agents presupposes accurate and up-to-date intelligence about terrorists and their activities. The agents may be manufactured using equipment necessary for the routine manufacture of drugs and vaccines, and the possibility of dual use of these facilities adds to the complexity of prevention. This has led some analysts to regard a strong public health infrastructure, with rapid and effective detection and response mechanisms for naturally occurring infectious diseases of outbreak potential, as the only reasonable means of responding to the threat of deliberately caused outbreaks of infectious disease. Adequate background information on the natural behaviour of infectious diseases will facilitate recognition of an unusual event and help determine whether suspicions of a deliberate use should be investigated. Preparedness for deliberate use also requires mechanisms that can be immediately called into action to enhance communication and collaboration among the public health authorities, the intelligence community, law enforcement agencies and national defence systems as need may arise. Preparedness should draw on existing plans for responding to large-scale natural disasters, such as earthquakes or industrial or transportation accidents, in which health care facilities are required to deal with a surge of casualties and emergency admissions. Most health workers will have little or no experience in managing illness arising from several of the potential infectious agents; training in clinical recognition and initial management may therefore be needed for rst xxxiii responders.

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